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Abstract 
1 
This paper examines the cause of ethnic peace, and subsequently, the cause of ethnic violence. 
Varying theories explain ethnic violence: primordialism, instrumentalism, and constructivism. 
The question central to this study is how master narratives, scarce resources, and democratic 
institutions have influenced the occurrence of ethnic violence. Small n comparison is used to 
analyze two pairs of sub-Saharan African nations in order to control for other explanatory 
variables: (1) Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana, and (2) Kenya and Tanzania. In each pair, one nation is 
relatively peaceful and the other relatively violent. Drawing from ethnographic research papers, 
and news sources this paper finds that while cultural and economic factors play heavily into 
ethnic violence, it is the carrying capacity of political institutions that enable ethnic peace. 
Better political institutions foster civic trust amongst citizens, and ensure peaceful means for the 
demonstration of political and economic frustrations 
2 
States have become increasingly multicultural. As a result, individuals of varying 
ethnicities have to live side by side. In recent decades, the world has witnessed multiple 
genocides, and silently stood by; most pundits blame historic grudges as the reason for collective 
violence. The "us against them" mentality may be accurate, but it is insufficient in explaining 
occurrences of ethnic violence. The same is true for competition over resources; there are 
multicultural nations where food, water, and jobs are scarce, and peace is abundant. This study 
seeks to understand why some nations spiral into violence, and even to genocide, while others 
foster peaceful coexistence. In a future of uncertainty where genocides continue to occur and 
where nations are in constant danger of slipping into the mire it is necessary to discern what 
causes ethnic violence, or what causes ethnic peace-different sides of the same coin. As the 
world becomes more interconnected and ethnic groups face one another more often, in order to 
ensure peace, nations must learn how to cultivate societies of civic trust across ethnic lines. The 
purpose of this study is to determine the causes of both ethnic violence and ethnic peace, and to 
understand how master narratives, scarce resources, and institutions of democracy and civil 
society influence the occurrence or absence of ethnic peace. 
The causal reasons for ethnic violence have been widely debated. Most studies on this 
subject can be grouped into three categories: primordialism (essentialist), instrumentalist 
(economic interests or political manipulation by the elites), or constructivism (institutions). 
However, the study of ethnic peace has not been a scholarly pursuit. This study will attempt to 
discern reasons for ethnic peace in order better understand how nations may engage in advancing 
it. It is first of all necessary to understand the three theoretical divisions in order to measure the 
proper variables, second how these theories have been applied to scholarly research, and finally, 
3 
an in depth case study analysis using small-N comparison for pairs of Sub-Saharan African 
nations. 
Before a substantial discussion can be had about ethnic peace it is necessary to make a 
distinction between ethnic conflict and ethnic violence, and also to define ethnic peace. Ashutosh 
Varshney asserts that any ethnically plural society allowing political demands to be expressed 
will inevitably have ethnic conflict.l Such conflict is not negative though, it may be the sign of 
legitimate democratic debate, while the lack of ethnic conflict may signal an authoritarian regime 
preventing ethnic mobilization.2 The problem is when ethnic conflict becomes violent. Conflict 
may occur in institutionalized forms such as debate within legislatures, but it can also occur in 
terms of rioting, or pogroms. Ethnic violence is also frequently used interchangeably with 
political violence, such as poll violence during election time or political imprisonment and 
torture, but ethnic violence is only applicable when there is an ethnic facet to the violence. 3 
Ethnic violence ranges from genocide to protests turned violent; it can be a lynching or a 
beating.4 The consequences and actions of ethnic conflict and ethnic violence are very different, 
and so explanations for both must be looked at separately. Ethnic peace therefore is not just the 
absence of violence but the channeling of ethnic conflict through institutions in order to reach 
1 Ashoutosh Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2002). Varshney is Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan, Anne Arbor, and 
this work won the Gregory Luebbert Prize of the American Political Science Association. 
2 Ibid 
3 Amy Chua, World onjire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global 
Instability (New York: Doubleday, 2003). Chua is a Professor of Law at Yale Law School and this work is New 
York Times bestseller. 
4 Kiyoteru Tsutsui, "Global Civil Society and Ethnic Social Movements," Sociological Forum 19, no. 1 
(2004); Tsutsui is a Professor of Sociology, at Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, New York. 
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mutually satisfying resolutions. 5 It is interethnic cooperation where violence does not become a 
tool for ethnic groups to use.6 
Primordialism 
As stated before, ethnic identity is conceived mainly in three ways with varying labels. 
The primordialist approach views ethnicity as fixed and culturally distinctive groups are 
ethnocentric, according to Kiyoteru Tsutsui a sociologist at Stony Brook.7 As is the nature of 
ascriptive identities they are ranked, written, and fixed. This theory arises out of evolutionary 
theory; ethnic identities are genetically imbedded leading individuals to favor their own kin in 
order to insure the survival of their genes.8 Adolf Hitler stated it quite simply in a 1938 speech in 
Konigsberg, "blood binds more firmly than business." For ethnic conflict to be rational within a 
framework of primordialism a few ideas are assumed: (1) ethnic identity is genetic and fixed, and 
(2) individuals perceive ethnic groups as extended kinship, making ethnic groups "inherently 
more potent as an organizing force.,,9 Ethnic difference is the reasoning behind ethnic violence. 
There have been numerous empirical studies correlating ethnic diversity with increased ethnic 
violence.I O  The main explanatory independent variable within primordialist theory is plural 
society, making the only solution ethnic homogeneity. However, primordialists fail in explaining 
the emergence of new identities, or shifts in societies that create different ethnic divisions. I I 
5 Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life 
6 James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Explaining Interethnic Cooperation," The American Political 
Science Review 90, no. 4 (1996). Fearon and Laitin are political science professors at the University of Chicago. 
7 Tsutsui, "Global Civil Society" . 
8 Frank P. Harvey, "Primordialism, Evolutionary Theory and Ethnic Violence in the Balkans: Opportunities 
and Constraints for Theory and Policy, " Canadian Journal of Political Science 33, no 1 (2000) 
9 Harvey, "Primordialism, Evolutionary Theory and Ethnic Violence," 40 10 Tatu Vanhanen, "Domestic Ethnic Conflict and Ethnic Nepotism: A Comparative Analysis," Journal of 
Peace Research26, no. 1 (1999). Vanhanen is Professor of Political Science at the University of Helsinki 
I I  David Lake and Donald Rothschild, The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and 
Escalation (New York, Princeton University Press, 1998); Lake is Professor of Political Science at University of 
California, San Diego, and Rothschild is Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Davis. 
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Scholars have mostly eschewed primordialist claims because they assume ethnic violence is 
inevitable in diverse societies. While varying ethnicities are necessary for ethnic violence to 
occur, it is insufficient in explaining the cause. 
Instrumentalism 
If primordialism assumes fixed identities, instrumentalism assumes extremely fluid 
definitions of ethnicity. Instrumentalism is a theory stringently based in rational action theory, 
rather than evolutionary biology, meaning it assumes individuals to be rational. In regards to 
joining ethnically based groups, individuals will enter into a costlbenefit analysis, and only if the 
individual benefit outweighs the individual costs for each member the group, will people engage 
in collective action. 1 2  For the purposes of this study, this means individuals will identity most 
strongly with certain parts of their identity for economic or political gain. James D. Fearon and 
David D Laitin, political science professors at the University of Chicago also term this theory 
rationalist: "Rationalist theories view ethnic groups as coalitions formed to extract material 
benefits from others or to defend possessions.,,1 3  Under this assumption many scholars assert that 
ethnic identity is much more fluid; it is not based on genetics, but rather on competition. People 
create identity to use opportunistically as a tool for furthering a group's aims. 
For the most part the literature discussing instrumentalism relies heavily on economic 
measures for cost and benefit. Psychological factors are explained in rare cases and as a side note 
because these variables are almost impossible to measure satisfactorily, however, that does not 
mean they are unimportant. Psychological factors claim people join ethnic groups for an intrinsic 
12 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1971). Olson was an American economist and social scientist, this work was radical in its 
time, founding ideas about the free rider problem. 
13 Fearon and Laitin, "Explaining Inter Ethnic Cooperation," 717 
human need to belong. 1 4  However, any attempt to find an empirical study with psychological 
factors as an independent variable, or even an explanation longer than a paragraph proved 
fruitless. 
One very specific theory within instrumentalism is market dominant minorities. I S  The 
Chinese dominate the Malaysian market, therefore the conflict while having a framework of 
ethnic division is actually and economic conflict. 1 6  This is also known as the stacking up of 
political cleavages. The reason for the conflict is not just ethnic identities, but also economic 
inequalities. The citizens of Malaysia have chosen to align along a Chinese-Malay line, rather 
than a Muslim-Christian, or native-foreigner because this enables them to use identity for 
political purposes. I ?  The benefit of ethnic mobilization increases when more factors separate a 
group from society at large, such as racial, linguistic, religious, geographical, or economic 
differences. I 8  This has also been termed grievance theory: "disadvantages and ensuing 
grievances among a group of people lead to collective action.I9 While very compelling, scholars 
6 
criticize grievance theory for its inability to predict the onset of ethnic violence.2o Some scholars 
cite the need for more resources and political opportunity along with grievances for the 
occurrence of ethnic mobilization.21 Grievances are a factor of importance, but are limited in 
explaining all occurrence of ethnic violence. Furthermore they do not inevitably lead to ethnic 
violence, or even ethnic mobilization. In rare cases they lead to quiescence; ethnic groups are so 
14 Olson, The Logic of Collective Action 
15 Chua, World On Fire 16 Ibid 
1 7  Ibid 
18  Ted R. Gurr, "Ethnic Warfare on the Wane." Foreign Affairs 79, no. 3 (May-June 2000); Gurr is 
Distinguished University Professor emeritus at the University of Maryland, and one of the world's leading 
authorities on political conflict 
19 Tsutsui, "Global Civil Society," 73 
20 Tsutsui, "Global Civil Society" 
21 Fearon and Laitin, "Explaining Inter Ethnic Cooperation"; and Tsutsui, "Global Civil Society" 
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used to inequalities, and from experience know there is little chance for change, leading to no 
mobilization despite egregious injustices.22 
There are holes in instrumentalist theory, aside from those specific to grievance theory, as 
well. It assumes there are similar motivations for ethnic violence and other types of conflict, and 
places ethnic violence as part of an overarching conflict.23 The assumption is ethnicity is some 
how a choice, rather than genetic or societal. The instrumental nature of ethnicity is true to some 
extent. David N. Posner proposes a new measure of ethnic groups based on this theory.24 It is 
useless for social scientists to count how many different ethnic groups there are, but rather only 
those which engage in politics, or are organized in interest groups. It is these politically relevant 
ethnic groups which are important because theirs is not a latent potential, but actualize.25 What 
Posner ignores in his study is that if ethnicity is purely elastic and instrumental then there would 
be little for political elites to exploit because conflict would be purely economically motivated.26 
Therefore, identities need to be politically salient, to be useful for exploitation. 
There is something to be said for group identification, it is compelling enough to average 
citizens to make them riot, or even tum them into 'fanatics.' The main problem with 
instrumentalism is it does not explain ethnic peace. For example there are nations which have 
ethnically based political parties, and according to democratic theory this is not only problematic 
but detrimental?7 This is evident in Spain where Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), a violent 
22 Olson, The Logic of Collective Action 
23 Lake and Rothschild, The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict, 6 24 David N. Posner, "Measuring Ethnic Fractionalization in Africa," American Journal of Political Science 
48, no. 4 (2004); Posner is Assistant Professor of Political Science at University of Cali fomi a, Los Angeles. 25 Posner, "Measuring Ethnic Fractionalization in Africa"; and Olson, The Logic of Collective Action 
26 Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life, 29 27 Kanchan Chandra, "Ethnic Parties and Democratic Stability," Perspectives on Politics 3, no. 2 (2005); 
and Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971); Chandra 
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separatist organization, also has a political wing, Batasuna, later outlawed for funding the ETA 
with public money. Conversely there are paticulraist political parties such as India's Bharatiya 
Janata Party (BJP), a Hindu nationalist party, which was elected to power from 1998 to 2004, 
over the secular Congress Party due to the public's dissatisfaction with the corruption within the 
Congress Party.28 
There are also cases where ethnic groups have grievances and/or political parties, but 
where ethnic mobilization does not turn violent.29 Ethnic cooperation is the main focus of this 
study. Instrumentalism does not hypothesize about how ethnic peace occurs; it hypothesizes as to 
what keeps ethnic violence at bay, whether it is due to a lack of grievances, or lack of resource 
for ethnic mobilization. Instrumentalism may explain the occurrence of ethnic conflict, but it 
does not explain ethnic violence. 
Constructivism 
A new discourse is arising out of ideas of social capital and civil society. Constructivism 
is essentially a bridge between primordialism and instrumentalism. It posits that ethnicity is a 
social identification, not just an individual one. Unlike instrumentalism, constructivism 
recognizes ethnicities are not chosen and that they change as society changes.3o So while ethnic 
violence may have some basis in competition it is competition along historical lines upheld by 
society. In the case of the United States this means it makes logical sense that race relations are 
tense between blacks and whites, but not between whites of eastern European and western 
is Associate Professor of Political Science at MIT; Dahl is the Sterling Professor emeritus of Political Science at 
Yale University, as well as a past president of the American Political Science Association 
28 Ashoutosh Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life 
29 Bruce E. Heilman and Paul J. Kaiser, "Religion, Identity and Politics in Tanzania," Third World 
Quarterly 23, no. 4 (August 2002); Fearon and Laitin, "Explaining Inter Ethnic Cooperation"; Heilman is in the 
Department of Political Science and Public Administration at the University of Dar es Salaam; Kaiser is t the 
African Studies Center at the University of Pennsylvania. 
30 Lake and Rothschild, The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict 
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European descent. Unlike primordialism, it does not assume multiple ethnicities in one nation to 
be inherently problematic.3 l  
Social capital explanations arise out of constructivist ideas because this theory does not 
accept that identity is purely instrumental, and therefore rejects purely economic or politically 
based solutions to ethnic violence. Social capital originated in sociolical studies; social capital 
theories believe social networks create trust between individuals which fosters more trusting 
individuals.32  Social capital, or civil society, is often operationalized in surveys asking 
individuals whether they are more likely to trust others, or whether one can never be too careful 
about other.33 According to Varshney civil society is any "non-state space of collective life.,,34 
This encompasses an infinite amount of association excluding family and state; it could be 
anything from book clubs to trade unions.35 
Along with the social capital approach there is the institutional approach. The assumption 
is that ethnic violence or peace arises out of a social system, and it is institutions that create 
societies.36 Important institutions like free press, elections, oppositions parties, independent 
legislatures and courts, and civilian control of the military channel ethnic conflict so that it does 
not turn violent. 37 Civilian control of the military refers to military intervention in political 
affairs, which is most often seen when militaries back a certain candidate and that individual 
gains office regardless of election results.38 Institutions and social capital both work to foster 
31 Ibid 
32 Tsutsui, "Global Civil Society" 
33 World Values Survey, "WVS 2005-2006 Wave, Root Version." http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org 
34 Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life, 4 35 Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life 
36 Lake and Rothschild, The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict 
37 Michael Bratton, "Deciphering Africa's Divergent Transitions." Political Science Quarterly 112, no. 1 
(Spring 1997): 69; Bratton is Professor of Political Science at Michigan State University, and a contributor to 
Afrobarometer 
38 Bratton, "Deciphering Africa," 84 
10 
trust amongst citizens, and as trust increases so does civic trust. 39 Groups, whether ethnic or not, 
view institutions as offering viable avenues for airing grievances whether real or perceived. 
Under a constructivist framework institutions can make all the difference; they can prevent 
instances of political manipulation. The key criticism of social capital is that it is a cure all for 
the ailments of society; it is difficult to measure, and yet is asserted as the key factor. Civil 
society is not an empirical measure, and can only be demonstrated, but social scientists are still 
unsure of the causal mechanisms behind it. 
The literature on ethnic violence and ethnic peace is vast, but each theory falls either 
squarely in these three frameworks, or in between. These are not mutually exclusive ideas, 
especially since constructivist theory is essentially a combination of primordiali sm and 
instrumentalism. Despite the lack of consensus on which approach is more accurate, it is 
necessary to define these frameworks in order to ensure the proper variables are analyzed. 
Empirical testing of Three Models 
The literature on ethnic violence can almost completely be divided by these three 
approaches. All of course have their caveats, and valid points. There are a few outlying 
explanations, although most are irrelevant to this study. 
Primordialism 
It would seem logical that primordialist reasoning for ethnic violence would be limited to 
non-empirical research, but this is precisely what Tatu Vanhanen has set out to demonstrate in an 
empirical study of 183 nations between 1990 and 1996.40 Vanhanen takes the theoretical 
standpoint that "all human populations share the same evolved behavioral predisposition to 
39 Jim M. Sanders, "Ethnic Boundaries and Identity in Plural Societies." Annual Review o/Sociology 28, 
(2002); Sanders is at the Department of Sociology at the University of South Carolina 
40 Vanhanen, "Domestic Ethnic Conflict" 
1 1  
ethnic nepotism.,,41 His study takes a common assumption and attempts to back it up with 
statistical significance. What he finds is that the evolutionary explanation holds true. As he 
explains, "we have evolved to favour our relatives in the struggle for existence because it has 
been an adaptive behavior pattem.,,42 Thus, the more ethnic heterogeneity found in a nation the 
more likely there will be ethnic conflict; he finds that this is the trend in the numbers. Minor 
variation between states is explained by other explanatory factors like democratization, human 
development, and gross domestic product per capita (PPP, purchasing power parity). The thesis 
of an "evolved disposition to nepotism" does allow for a general theory which can be tested. This 
represents a theoretical improvement over scholars who use culturally specific factors, which are 
inherently unfalsifiable.43 
Vanhanen however broadly defines ethnic conflict; there are measures included for non-
violent conflict such as ethnic partisanship which are added to a nation's total ethnic conflict 
score. Vanhanen does a very poor job of disguising ordinal levels of measure as interval in 
measuring a nation's ethnic conflict score. The difference between ratings is explained in 
intervals of ten, but Vanhanen does not explain the difference between a score of then versus on 
of twelve.44 Further, Vanhanen includes ethnically aligned political parties as adding to violence 
under the assumption that particularism on a non-violent level either leads to or accompanies 
violent ethnic bias. As cited before, Varshney would criticize the lack of division between 
measuring ethnic conflict and ethnic violence. Thus, Vanhanen is measuring the wrong variables, 
as conflict does not inherently lead to violence. 
41 Ibid, 55 
42 Ibid, 66 
43 Ibid, 56 44 Ibid, 62 
12 
This critique of Vanhanen's study is not meant to throw primordialist explanations 
completely out the window, but rather to demonstrate identity is not purely ascriptive.45 
Although culture is not the sole explanation, it is important and necessary to discuss it when 
considering ethnic violence. Culture is important for a collective, after all people have killed over 
cultural difference. Genocide is by definition is systematic killing with the design to exterminate 
an entire group. The danger is putting too much stake in culture and reducing explanations for 
ethnic violence to simple primordialism. Culture and ethnic identity is the field on which 
violence can cast its seeds and cultivate. It is culture plus other factors that lead to ethnic 
violence: "there are . . .  significant difference in the use of motives and interests as explanatory 
mechanisms which are central to the difference between cultural and rational choice 
explanations.,,46 
Instrumentalism 
Instrumentalism allows for a much more malleable interpretation of identity and for more 
explanations of ethnic violence. The literature points out a vast array of theories, and factors that 
play into the complicated, intricate web on which ethnic violence rests. As stated before there are 
interest-based models and those which point solely to elite manipulation as explanations. Dauda 
Abubakar points out groups are prone to elite manipulation only if elite views echo current 
public concerns: "ethnic identities become seriously amenable to political manipulation either 
when suppressed groups feel marginalized from the political and economic process affecting 
45 Amin Maalouf, In the Name of Identity (New York: Penguin Books, 2000); Lake and Rothschild, The 
International Spread of Ethnic Conflict; Heilman and Kaiser, "Religion, Identity and Politics"; Maalouf is a 
Lebanese novelist whose books focus on the experience of civil war and migration. 
46 Marc Howard Ross, "The Relevance of Culture for the Study of Political Psychology and Ethnic 
Conflict," Political Psychology 18 (2007); Ross is Professor of Political Science at Bryn Mawr College. 
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their lives of when privileged groups feel that their rights are threatened.,,47 Abubakar goes on to 
describe the case of Nigeria and how "the accumulated impact of decades of ethnic minority 
marginalization; and the imposition of an economic adjustment program that increased poverty, 
unemployment, and despair in the society.,,48 Instrumentalism is also termed the modernist 
theory.49 The idea behind this theory is that colonizing nations such as the British and French 
exacerbated ethnic rivalry when they used divide and conquer strategies. This was followed by 
structural adjustment, demanded by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, which 
intensified poverty, leaving nations deeply fractured and poor. Thus it was the stacking up of 
cleavages that led to the onset of ethnic violence. As stated previously the puzzling thing about 
arguments heavily based on cultural arguments is that nations which seem to fit the criteria for 
balancing on the brink of peace and chaos are in fact remarkably peaceful, meaning there must 
be other explanations for ethnic peace not encompassed under instrumentalist theories. 
Fearon and Laitin empirically test GDP per capita, and the population share of the largest 
ethnic group, with the likelihood of civil war. 50 Amongst their hypotheses is the common 
assumption the more diverse (or the smaller the popUlation share of the largest ethnic group) and 
the lower the GDP per capita, the more at risk a nation is for civil war. In a study of 127 conflicts 
out of a sample of 6,610 country years, Fearon and Laitin find that ethnic diversity is not a major 
cause of civil war; the key explanatory variable found in their study was per capita income. 51 
However, this does not make ethnic diversity inconsequential because it may still "cause civil 
47 Dauda Abubakar, "Ethnic Identity, Democratization, and the Future of the African State: Lessons from 
Nigeria," African Issues 29 (2001): 32 
48 Ibid 34 
49 Var�hney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life 
50 Fearon and Laitin, "Explaining Inter Ethnic Cooperation" 
51 Ibid 
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war indirectly, if it causes a low per capita income.,,52 Per capita income has much more to do 
with civil war than ethnic diversity. For example, nations with a GDP per capita over 3000 US 
dollars have almost no risk of civil war no matter what the ethnic composition, and nations that 
are 90% homogenous, but with a GDP per capita of under 500 US dollars have a 3 0% chance of 
. '1 . 1 53 ClVl VlO ence. 
In one model Fearon and Laitin limit the cases to ethnic wars and find that the strong 
effect of per capita income remains. 54 This does not answer whether the cause of ethnic violence 
is economic scarcity; it merely indicates civil war is more likely in poor nations. It also does not 
address how some poor nations are peaceful. Although there may be correlation this does not 
justify causation, and civil war and economic scarcity can be self reinforcing, meaning as nations 
grow unstable and poor they are likely to continue to be so, which will be discussed later. The 
question remains, whether ethnic violence is the tool of a political or economic group. One 
important factor they tease out is that nations are more than five times as likely to enter into civil 
war if there has been "instability in governing arrangements in any of the previous three years.,,55 
This indicates that a nation with better and more legitimate institutions, despite economic or 
demographic factors, is less likely to descend into violence either ethnic or civil. 
Another facet of instrumentalism is political entrepreneurs or manipulation of ethnicity 
by elites for political gains. The history of certain African nations illustrates this point all too 
well. Daniel arap Moi, Umaru Yar' Adua, and Laurent Gbagbo are just a few examples of 
cunning-if not morally repugnant-political leaders who have incited ethnic violence for their 
52 Ibid, 82 
53 Ibid 
54 Ibid 84 
55 Ibid: 85 
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political gain. Kenyans seem to understand best how ethnicity can be utilized for politics as they 
continue to experience outbreaks of violence every time they hold an election since their first 
multiparty elections in 1992. This reasoning is compelling, and probably helps in explaining 
quite a few cases of ethnic violence. What instrumentalism fails to explain is when ethnic groups 
use peaceful avenues for ethnic conflict, rather than turning to violence. While the occurrence of 
political prospecting cannot be prevented, political institutions do control for institutional 
openings available for exploiting ethnic groups, and allow for the peaceful expression of political 
dissent. 
Constructivism 
The other major explanation put forth is the importance of institutions. This is also the 
most compelling in answering the causes of ethnic peace. Institutions has been the opposition to 
the primordialist based arguments and papers. One concept that is part of this is the idea that 
political liberalization will first lead to an increase in violence, and once democratization occurs 
there will be a decrease in ethnic violence. Liberalization, here, is defined as the loosening of 
political control, such as allowing freedom of press, getting rid of arrests without charges, 
freedom from torture, or the "institutionalization of procedures for popular govemment.,,56 The 
explanations and variables for ethnic peace are similar or exactly the same as those presented for 
democratization theories. Smith focused on Sub-Saharan Africa, and showed that liberalization 
in fact leads to a decrease in violence, and democratization has little to no visible effect after 
that. 57 Unlike Vanhanen, Smith found purchasing power parity, once again a proxy for human 
development, to have a robust inverse relationship with ethnic violence. 58 This reconfirms that 
56 Smith, "The Impact of Political Liberasation," 58 
57 Ibid 58 Ibid, 33 
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interests are a key factor of ethnic violence, but that "institutions sometimes can and do 
overcome the constraints imposed on them by structural determinants. ,,59 
When there are viable political institutions for individuals and collectives to express their 
interests the violent reaction to interest based factors is reduced because there are democratic 
outlets for these concerns. Ethnic violence is based on concerns over such things competition 
over resources, and security, but when the citizenry can utilize things like elections, or even more 
simply when they feel that the state is addressing their anxieties or the media is voicing their 
opinion, then the likelihood of ethnic violence lessens.6o As stated before institutions such as a 
free press can be key to ethnic peace, as can a civilian controlled military. For example in 
Burundi it was the Tutsi who controlled the military, and so what propagated the onset of some 
of the killing sprees was Tutsi fear of a Hutu uprising and so in order to protect themselves they 
had the military kill thousands of Hutu either with no reason or with rumored killings of Tutsi 
villages by Hutu people.61 
Varshney rejects an institutional explanation because according to him it fails to explain 
regional differences in ethnic violence.62 In the case of India this seems to be true; different areas 
of India share all the same institutions. But some cities and regions experience numerous riots 
and killings, while others are completely or relatively peaceful. He posits that the actual make-it-
or-break-it factor is civil society. However fascinating a regional case study like Varshney's 
translated for a few African nations would be, the availability of data is an overwhelming 
59 Ibid, 35 
. 60 Lake and Rothschild, The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict; Bratton, "Deciphering Africa's 
Divergent Transitions" 
61 Peter Uvin, "Ethnicity and Power in Burundi and Rwanda: Different Paths to Mass Violence," 
Comparative Politics 31, no. 3 (April 1999); Uvin is the Henry J. Leir Professor of International Humanitarian 
Studies at Tufts University. 
62 Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life, 38 
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obstacle. Varshney read different Indian newspapers for years and interpreted incidences like 
riots as either ethnically driven or not; he was also in India.63 The problem is there really is no 
way to verify Varshney' s study; the reasoning may be compelling, but it could be that India is an 
isolated incident because it is such a huge nation. Also it is difficult to discern whether or not 
strong democratic institutions encourage civic engagement. 
Research Design 
Africa presents interesting cases of ethnic diversity, scarce resources, varying experiences 
with colonialism, and a wide variance in institutional strengths. The dependent variable for this 
study is ethnic violence, but because conflict and violence do not occur in a vacuum a multitude 
of political and historical factors must also be analyzed. Selecting the dependent variable can 
isolate certain causal factors. This study wi11 look at two pairs of sub-Saharan African nations: 
(1) Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana, and (2) Kenya and Tanzania. One nation is relatively violent and 
the other relatively peaceful, respectively. By using small-n comparison method, the finer details 
of what causes ethnic peace can be teased out. These nations have specific master narratives, or 
ways in which they construct their national identity; they are all developing nations; and they 
have varying institutional factors. 
The hypothesis to be explored is that institutions absorb conflict either by creating 
peaceful mechanisms or by preventing abuse in political systems. This institutional carrying 
capacity, or the ability for institutions to channel conflict into peaceful avenues, is what best 
explains the occurrence of ethnic peace in nations at risk. The expected results are that master 
narratives will be oppositional and particularist, showing that ethnic conflict while present, does 
63 Ibid 
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not necessarily lead to ethnic violence. The resources of all will be scarce and so the conflict or 
violence will not be a product of economic battling, but over political rights. Nations with strong 
institutions such as, elections, free press, separate legislatures and courts will not be marred by 
ethnic violence, even though the minority groups may seem ripe for it. In other words many of 
these nations have demographics which make them more than likely candidates for ethnic 
conflict, but the exact opposite has been true, especially in the case of Tanzania. Gurr termed 
these groups minorities at risk, and so this study seeks to answer how to make risky national 
. .. £ 64 mmonties sa e. 
The dependent variable therefore is ethnic violence. This study will limit this to violent 
interactions with an ethnic flavor, such as rioting, lynching, or murders. These may not be very 
specific numbers but since this is a comparative study a general presence of such violence may 
be able to suffice, of course depending on the lack of violence in the peaceful nations. Unlike 
V arshney' s this study will focus on nations and not regions. And, since there are better measures 
for national violence, rather than regional, the overall peacefulness of a nation can be determined 
more easily.65 An ordinal level measure can be employed for ethnic violence.66 This will allow 
for a varying level to be ascertained, although allowing for a great deal of leeway. 
Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire share a border, are both coastal western nations, and have 
demographics that are fairly similar. Ghana is relatively peaceful and in fact the poster child of 
structural adjustment and Cote d'Ivoire is mired in problems, even with the presence of 9,000 
64 GUIT, "Ethnic Warfare on the Wane" 65 Rogers Brubaker and David D. Laitin, "Ethnic and Nationalist Violence." Annual Review of Sociology 24 
(1998); Brubaker is Professor of Sociology at the University of California, Los Angeles 66 Zeric Kay Smith, "The Impact of Political Liberalisation and Democratisation on Ethnic Conflict in 
Africa: An Empirical Test of Common Assumptions." The Journal of Modern African Studies 38, no. 1 (March 
2000): 21; Smith is Senior Research Associate at Walker Institute if Intemational Studies at the University of South 
Carolina 
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UN forces.67 The one obvious problem in this pairing is that Ghana was colonized by the British, 
and Cote d'Ivoire by the French. Different colonial powers vastly change the experience of each 
nation, and thus make them irrelevant to compare. Obviously the colonial experience has shaped 
each of these nations very differently, and so this is not an area which should simply be ignored; 
this is a key possible explanation for the vast difference between these neighbors. These nations 
have similar GDP per capita, poverty levels, ethnic and religious break downs; the key difference 
is their colonial past. 
Tanzania is one of the most stable and peaceful nations in Africa. Muslims are dominant 
in the region of Zanzibar comprising almost 99% of the population, and as a whole 35% of the 
total population.68 In neighboring Kenya, President Daniel arap Moi buckled to pressure and 
allowed for multi-party elections, although warning that parties would polarize the country on 
ethnic lines.69 It seems he was right. The problem of this pair is that Tanzania is 30% Christian 
whereas Kenya is at least 70% Christian, with it Muslim estimates varying.70 Varshney would 
probably object to this pairing, citing it as a case of comparing apples to oranges. However, what 
this pairing does show is the huge difference trust in institutions can make. Although there are 
nations with comparable religious break downs, Kenya allows a comparison of neighbors, two 
east coast nations, and controls for similar ethnic or lingual divides. Both are former British 
colonies with very different histories pre World War II, but their post-independence history and 
government policies have diverged even more. 
67 CIA World Factbook, "Cote d'Ivoire," https:llwww.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world­
factbookl geos/iv.html 
68 CIA World Factbook, "Tanzania," https:llwww.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world­
factbookl geos/tz.html 
69 BBC, "Kenya," http://news.bbc.co.ukl2/hi/africa/country_profiles/1024563.stm 
70 CIA World Factbook, "Kenya," https:llwww.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world­
factbooklgeos/ke.html; CIA World Factbook, "Tanzania" 
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Data and Analysis 
In order to create a cohesive story or each country, data will be presented nation by 
nation. The history of ethnic conflict or violence will be detailed, then the relevant economic 
factors, meaning the distribution of wealth and socioeconomic standing as seen between ethnic 
groups, and finally the role institutions have in allowing ethnic violence or channeling ethnic 
conflict peacefully.71 
Ghana 
Ghana was the first sub-Saharan nation to gain independence from the British in 1957 
and set the example for other nations.72 Like most African nations Ghana is extremely diverse. 
There are approximately 100 different cultural and linguistic groups. The major ethnic groups are 
Akan, Ewe, Mole-Dagbane, Guan, and Ga-Adanbe.73 There are cultural, historical, and linguistic 
differences and they are rooted in historical competition for trade and land control. 
The history of Ghana is highly unique because it was the first African nation to break 
from colonialism. Some attribute this freedom to the fact that it was the time for such changes: 
"the wind of change is blowing through the continent ... the growth of national consciousness is a 
political fact and we must take account of it.,,74 Most scholars and pundits however give credit to 
its first president Kwame Nkrumah who helped to lead the independence movement from Britain 
more than fifty years ago. It is difficult to see how Ghana's history has been particularist at all 
when analyzing Nkrumah who espoused pan-Africanism and in many cases was able to practice 
71 While infinite examples could be given this study strives to present key examples for the sake of 
concision and clarity. 
72 BBC. "Ghana" http://news.bbc.co.ukl2/hi/africa/country-profiles/l023355.stm 
73 CIA World Factbook, "Ghana," https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world­
factbookl geos/ gh.html 
74 BBC On This Day, "1960: Macmillan speaks of 'wind of change' in Africa," 
http://news. bbc.co. ukl onthisday/hi/ dates/ stories/ february/3/newsid_2714000/2714 5 25. stm 
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what he preached.75 Nkrumah looked not just beyond the needs of his ethnic group, but beyond 
the needs of his own nation, perhaps to Ghana's detriment. Famously he supported loans to 
newly independent Guinea after the French left it on the brink of collapse. 76 Nkrumah envisioned 
and strived for a Ghana as well as an Africa where its people would command the natural and 
agricultural resources without the west, and where poverty would be eradicated.77 This vision 
was the ideal, and Nkrumah fell unfortunately far from it. He may have had a dream, but in 
attempting to realize it Nkrumah turned into an autocrat instituting detention for up to five years 
without trial in 1958, and declaring himself life president in 1964.78 A coup in 1966 led to 
Nkrumah's exile to Guinea where he died in 1972 of cancer. 79 What Nkrumah did accomplish is 
admirable in some respects though; he set up a particular political culture in Ghana and where 
expansions in education and healthcare remain his legacy. 80 
This is of course a highly selective tale of recent Ghana history. Amid all of Nkrumah's 
aspirations were the troubles of a fledging nation, fears over "internal fighting between various 
tribes in the region over a new constitutions.,,81 Furthermore ethnic rivalry has not been absent 
from Ghana's history. As recently as June 2008 so called 'ethnic clashes' broke out in the 
northeastern town of Bawku.82 BBC news states the clashes are part of a long rivalry; the dispute 
is over a chieftaincy between the Kusasi and Mamprusi and has resulted in a military presence 
, 
75 BBC, "Ghana"; Yao Graham, "Africa: Nkrumah at 100 Lessons for African Leadership," Pambazuka 
News, April 9, 2009. http://allafrica.com/stories/200904100166.html 
76 Graham, "African: Nkrumah at 100" 
77 Kwaku Sakyu-Addo, "The Architect of Ghana's Independence," BBe News, March 2, 2007. 
http://news.bbc.co.ukl2/hi/africal6382237.stm 
78 BBC "Ghana" 
79 Ibid
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80 Donald Ray, Ghana (London: Frances Pinter, 1986) 
81 BBC On This Day, "1957: Ghana Celebrates Independence," 
http://news.bbc.co. uk/onthisday/hil dates/stories/marchl6/newsid_2515000/2515459 .stm 
82 BBC News, "Bid to End Deadly Ghana Clashes," June 25, 2008, 
http://news.bbc.co.ukl2/hilafricaI7474005.stm 
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and a night curfew since the beginning of year. At least thirteen people have been slaughtered 
machetes in this latest dispute, including women and children.83 Preceding this incident women 
and children had not been killed, which has been pointed out as a sign of escalating violence.84 
While ethnicity has not played the role in Ghana as in other African nations it continues to play a 
role in politics. Political leaders and commentators continue to preface controversial topics with 
the fact they are not trying to stir up ethnic rivalry, showing how ethnic conflict is very much 
something to be mindful of. What these two differing tales of Ghana do show is that the history 
of ethnic conflict violent, or peaceful has been ambiguous in Ghana, as it has been in all nations 
with multiple ethnicities. 
In terms of the economy, Ghana has one of the highest GDP per capita in Africa, 
although it is still quite dependent upon international aid and assistance.85 Cocoa has been the 
main export, which due to its seasonal nature left many without incomes for large parts of the 
year; however there has been the recent discovery of oil in 2007 which is expected to have a 
huge impact.86 Compared to other African nations Ghana's economy is stable and overall things 
look promising. On the negative side, the depreciation of the Cedi over decades has forced 
Ghana to introduce a new denomination, the Ghana Cedi, with an exchange rate of one Ghana 
Cedi for every 10,000 Cedi.87 Poverty rates in Ghana while lower than in Cote d'Ivoire remain 
with almost a third of the population below the poverty line, meaning a third of the population 
lives on less than two US dollars a day.88 
83 Ibid 
84 Ibid 85 BBC News, "Ghana" 
86 Ibid 
87 CIA World Factbook, "Ghana" 
88 CIA World Factbook, "Cote d'Ivoire" 
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Finally there are the institutional factors. Ghana's institutions have taken the ethnic 
conflict and channeled it into peaceful competition. There has been much recent scrutiny of 
Ghana's institutions due to the presidential election in December of 2008.89 Compared to its 
neighbors Ghana is a peaceful idyllic nation, which only goes to show the state of democracy in 
other African nations.9o It should be noted that in using the term democracy this study would like 
to stay as far as possible away from an idea of exporting US democracy. Rather democracy, if it 
is to be at all successful must reflect the society of a nation, to state otherwise would be 
ethnocentric. One indication of Ghana's uniquely sustainable democracy is its electoral 
commission. This commission, headed by Kwado Afari-Djan for four elections, although 
appointed under partisan structures has overseen the fall of incumbent parties and has been a 
credible organization for conduction free and fair elections.91 Equally important is Ghana's free 
media whose only downfall is the lack of technology available for reaching citizens.92 Because 
of this free media Ghanaians will be able to hear election results within 24 hours, constraining 
the ability for corruption to falsify results.93 
Cote d'Ivoire 
Contrasting with Ghana's seemingly picturesque world is Cote d'Ivoire which has been 
independent from France since 1960.There are more than sixty ethnic groups in Cote d'Ivoire, 
and due to its relative economic success immigrants from surrounding impoverished nations 
have flooded in and now comprise over a quarter of the population. Until 2002 when civil war 
89 KomIa Dumor, "Can Ghana Trounce the Bad News?" BBe News, December 6, 2008, 
http://news.bbc.co.ukl2/hi/africa/7768061.stm 
90 BBC News "Ghana" 
91 Dumor, "C�n Ghana Trounce the Bad News" 
92 Ibid 
93 The presidential election resulted in runoffs reducing the field from eight to two. John Evans Atta Mills 
won eventually and the government turnover was peaceful and smooth. 
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broke out Cote d'Ivoire was much like Ghana; it was the nation which other African nations 
strived to emulate, an example of stable African democracy.94 Now it has become the example of 
how very quickly ethnic conflict can escalate into ethnic violence. Although fighting has 
subsided for the most part, the country remains divided with rebels controlling the north, and the 
government controlling the south.95 Amongst reasons often cited for the civil war is the influx of 
foreigners, predominantly from Burkina Faso, and discrimination of individuals of Burkina be 
descent. 'Ivoirity' is a term originally coined to be inclusive and bring together people of Ivorian 
descent, however Henri Bedie skewed its meaning to serve his own political purposes and 
encourage xenophobia against Muslim northerners and so called non-Ivoirians (BBC). Scholars 
cite the strong leadership of Houphouet-Boigny as the reason that ethnic tensions did not boil 
over earlier. Houphouet-Boigny's successor was Bedie who fled in the 1999 coup by Robert 
Guei. Interestingly, among non-Ivoirians was Bedie's political rival Alassane Ouattara, who was 
barred from the election due to his non-Ivorian parentage. 96 
Even in recent news reports Cote D'Ivoire has been the scene of much ethnic violence; 
mostly in the form of revenge attack by a Guere tribe on a Dioula tribe in the north. Gueres killed 
forty-one Dioula villagers; in response to a hundred Gueres were cut to pieces with machetes and 
sprayed with bullets. Guere is a term derived from the word for forest-dwelling people, and is in 
fact sometimes used in general to refer to people considered uncivilized. Dioula is a variation of 
a word referring to "the land of slaves captures through warfare.',97 The exact differences 
between these groups is very confusing; the Guere in some parts are the Wobe, and the Dioula 
94 BBC News "Ivory Coast " 95 CIA World' Factbook, "C�te d'Ivoire" 
96 BBC News, "Ivory Coast"; Lara Pawson, "Ethnic Split Stirs Ivory Coast Crisis," BBe News, February 
18, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.ukl2/hilafricaJ3496069.stm 97 Svend E. Hosoe and Joseph J. Lauer, "Who are the KraniGuere and the GiolY acouba? Ethnic 
Identification along the Liberia-Ivory Coast Border," African Studies Review 19, no. 1 (April 1976) 
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are dialectically similar to the Wobe, and early scholars called the Dioula, and both languages 
are Mande languages.98 What is clear is that their definitions of themselves are in opposition to 
one another. What sparked the ethnic killings in 2005 has been reported to be a refusal by the 
Guere to take part in an indigenous protest organized by the Dioula. Whether or not this is the 
truth may in fact be irrelevant in light of the escalated response. 
Due to Cote d'Ivoire's recent violence, its once rich economy has entered into crisis. Cote 
d' Ivoire's loss has been Ghana's gain, as stability is suspect in Cote d'Ivoire companies are 
diverting trade to neighboring nations, although businesses suspect this is not a lasting effect. 99 
This means ethnic violence preceded economic problems in Cote d'Ivoire: "Ivory Coast used to 
be a beacon of peace and prosperity in West Africa, attracting millions of migrant workers and 
refugees." 100 
These two nations have strikingly different histories. While Cote d'Ivoire's recent politics 
has been centered on rejection of other Africans, Ghana's history began with ideas of uniting 
Africans. It might be that economic interests are the root cause. The gross domestic product 
(GDP) per capita of Ghana ( 1,5 16) is lower than that of Cot d'Ivoire ( 1,775), but a greater 
percentage of the citizenry is in poverty in Cote d'Ivoire compared to Ghana, 42 to 28.5 
respectively. 101 
Instrumentalism also takes the form of political manipulation by the elites. Human Rights 
Watch in 2001 accused the Ivoirian government of deliberately using ethnic violence for political 
gains. The gendarmes or paramilitary police were targeting supporters of the opposing candidate 
Ouattara (the foreigner). The gendarmes during the election sided with Laurent Gbagbo, who 
98 Ibid 
99 Pawson, "Ethnic Split Stirs Ivory Coast Crisis" 
100 BBC News, "Ivory Coast" 
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won against Guei, the incumbent military ruler. Human Rights Watch claims "200 people were 
killed in the past year, while others were tortured, raped and arbitrarily detained."l o2 The 
gendarmes implicated were found not guilty in spite of the testimony of two survivors. 
Finally the institution of Cote d'Ivoire paint an even more starkly contrasting picture 
compared to Ghana. Cote d'Ivoire is dominated by one party and although there are legislatures 
and courts independent from the executive branch, presidential elections have not been held 
since 2000.1 03 Laurent Gbagbo was elected in 2000 for a five-year mandate, in 2006 the UN in 
an effort to stabilize the nation gave Gbagbo a seventh successive year, and elections have been 
set back numerous times, most recently in October of 2008.1 04 The Civic Youth Movement of 
Cote d'Ivoire (MJCC-CI) through rallies and strikes calls for the long over-due elections. lOS 
Many view successful presidential elections as key to returning the political stability and 
economic prosperity of Cote d'Ivoire.1 06 However, no timeframe has been given for election, and 
although they are expected to occur sometime in 2009 it would not be terribly surprising if they 
were delayed again. While there are no numbers yet on trust in institutions for Cote d'Ivoire, 
violence preventing proper studies of the nation, protests are a strong indication that Ivoirians are 
dissatisfied with the state of affairs in their nation. 
These nations are both ethnically diverse, and this has caused violence, although to 
varying degrees. So the effect of ethnicity is consistent in that there are ethnicities which do 
conflict. The effect of economic interests is difficult to deduce because while Cote d'Ivoire has a 
102 BBC News, "Ivory Coast 'Fanning Ethnic Hatred," http://news.bbc.co.ukl2/hilafrica/1512884.stm 
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1 04 Ibid 
105 allAfrica.com, "Cote d'Ivoire: Ivoirians 'Held Hostage' by Politicians, Youths Say,:' April 1, 2009, 
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higher percentage of its populous in poverty, it also has a greater GDP per capita. 1 07 Further, it is 
difficult to discern where a threshold of poverty might be. So perhaps below a certain GDP per 
capita or PPP it does not matter about variation because either way the citizenry is poor. The 
causal mechanism of grievance theory is also unclear. In the case of Cote d'Ivoire it seems the 
case is more likely that ethnic violence has resulted in economic hardships, rather than the other 
way around, which instrumentalists would believe. Political manipulation may explain why Cote 
d'Ivoire has been mired in ethnic violence, while Ghana has sustained peace. Indeed it has been 
the case that leaders in Africa have used ethnicity to bolster their own support. However, this 
begs the question as to why Ghanaian politicians are unable to get away with ethnic 
manipulation. It does not seem likely that Ghanaian politicians intrinsically have a better 
commitment to free and fair elections, rather institutions like the electoral commission constrain 
their political tool box. Meanwhile in Cote d'Ivoire the military took sides in politics, and used 
fear to keep the opposition supporters from the polls. Had the military stayed out of the political 
arena then there would have been less means for politicians to use ethnicity. 
This pairing must concede flaws such as the more ethnically inclusive political history of 
Ghana. However, what it does show is how institutions are able to channel outcomes of ethnic 
conflict. Ethnic conflict is present in both Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire, but it is institutions which 
have prevented the out break of violence in Ghana, such as laws against ethnically based political 
parties, and stringent laws over elections. So while specific historical instances, like the 
leadership of Nkrumah, are not generalizable for other nations, the impact of institutions is. 
107 CIA World Factbook, "Cote d'!voire" 
Table 1 
Ghana Cote d'Ivoire 
Politically active military * Not since 1981 2002 military uprising 
Independent legislatures * Yes No 
Viable opposition parties * Yes No 
Free press * High Low 
Level of freedom * *  3 - free 12 - not free 
Trust in institutions ***  64.9% NA 
Trust your ethnicity compared to other 56.5% NA 
ethnicities ***  43.5% 
GDP per capita **** 1,516 1,775 
% below poverty line ****  28.5 42 
*detennined by interpretive reading of BBC country profiles and articles 
**Freedom House- the number is a total of the rating for political and civil liberties, lower being better with 14 as 
the maximum 
*** Afrobarometer Round 3- percent responding "a lot" or "somewhat" out of 4 choices 
****CIA World Fact book 
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Tanzania in its present form is the result of the 1964 union of mainland Tanganyika and 
the island of Zanzibar.1 08Tanzania is almost equally divided almost equally in terms of religion 
between Christians, Muslims, and indigenous African religions. ! 09 No particular identity has 
dominated society, however Zanzibar is almost completely Muslim, and Muslims are more 
concentrated on the coast of Tanganyika. Similar to Ghana and Nkrumah, Julius Kambarage 
Nyerere the leader of the Tanganyikan African National Union, detribalized politics in Tanzania; 
both were proponents of Pan-Africanism. ! 1 0  Religion is still a highly divisive issue. According to 
a nation-wide opinion poll "people objected to inter religious marriages more strongly than to 
other forms of cross-identity marriages."! ! !  The religious divide is also the only one to manifest 
IDS CIA World Factbook, "Tanzania" 
109 Ibid 
l ID Chambi Chachage, "Africa: African Unity Feeling with Nkrumah, Thinking with Nyerere," 
Pambazuka News, April 9, 2009, http://allafrica.com/stories/200904100140.html 
I I I  Heilman and Kaiser, "Religion, Identity and Politics," 695 
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itself in political parties with the ruling party of the Tanganyika being mainly Christian, and the 
ruling party of Zanzibar being mainly Muslim. 1 1 2  
The master narrative of Tanzania is even more ambiguous than Ghana's. The 
independence movement that took place in Tanzania was filled with rhetoric about the need to 
get rid of second-class citizenship based on racism, something seen as a construct of colonial 
rule. 1 1 3  Nyerere enacted a law for multi-racial citizenship. Furthermore many Muslims became 
leaders of the independence movement while Christian churches discouraged activities. 1 1 4  Thus 
Christians joined Muslim leaders in the national struggle. Despite this inclusive history of its 
independence, the "feeling among many Muslims [is] that the country's educated elite is 
disproportionately made up of Christians."I I 5  Because Zanzibar is 99% Muslim Zanzibaris view 
the union of the mainland and the island as unequal, especially in the distribution of resources.1 16 
Civic United Front (CUF) is the main opposition party, mostly based in Zanzibar; its platform is 
that Zanzibar's union tq the mainland has not been a positive as there has been a drop in living 
standards, and a deterioration in infrastructure, specifically in education and medical care. 1 1 7  
Meanwhile, mainlanders view Zanzibar as an economic burden, and critique its poor human 
rights record. 1 1 8  
In  2005 Tanzania went through and economic slump and the tensions between Zanzibar 
and the mainland increased during that period. It seems clear that economic competition has 
fueled, if not caused, ethnic conflict and violence in Tanzania. Muslim-Christian tensions are not 
112 Ibid; Ahmed Rajab, "Tanzania Split Will Go On," BBe Focus on Africa Magazine, September, 28, 
2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilafrical4287890.stm 
1 1 3  Heilman and Kaiser, "Religion, Identity and Politics" 
114  Ibid 
1 15 Heilman and Kaiser, "Religion, Identity and Politics," 698 
116  CIA World Factbook, "Tanzania"; Statistics on religion are estimated because religious questions were 
eliminated from the census in 1967. 
I l7 Rajab, "Tanzania Split" 
l I S  Ibid 
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over fundamental religious differences, but over the distribution of jobs, and national 
resources.1 l9 However, there has not been a constant state of violence, and really the only 
violence to occur has been poll violence in Zanzibar, while the mainland has remained peaceful. 
As much as Zanzibaris may view the union as unbeneficial, there is the competing view that 
what Zanzibar has given up in autonomy they have gained in economic and political clout, 
. 11 . h . . I 120 espeCIa y m t e mternatlOna arena. 
Unfortunately the story highlighted in this study is not clear cut, but causal mechanisms 
are rarely clear cut outside of the lab. Tanzania's institutions have similarly ambiguous 
explanations. Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) is the ruling party in Tanzania and despite fifteen 
years of multiparty elections it still acts as a one-party state. 121 In spite of effective one-party rule 
trust in institutions is remarkably high. Trust in other ethnicities is also extremely high, 
especially considering how ethnically aligned political parties are. 122 Zanzibar has many 
institutional barriers protecting its autonomy such as its own parliament, presidency, flag, and 
football team.1 23 The partnership between mainland Tanganyika and the island of Zanzibar has 
lasted since 1964, although with mixed reviews. Whether this union has lasted because of the 
federalist structure, or Zanzibar's independent membership in Fifa, it is quite telling that 
Tanzania has been "spared the internal strife that has blighted so many African nations.,,1 24 
Kenya 
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Kenya gained independence from Britain in 1963. Like Tanzania no ethnic majority. 
While Kikuyu is the most widely spoken mother tongue it represents little over twenty percent of 
the population. Most Kenyans are multi-lingual and speak English, Swahili, as well as a mother 
tongue. The major ethnic groups in Kenya are Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya, Maasai, and Kalenjin.125 
Kikuyus led the independence movement in Kenya, and since have enjoyed the benefits 
of one-party rule. 1 26 The oppressive regime of Jomo Kenyatta sought rents for the Kikuyu in 
terms of land ownership in the Rift Valley, which has been the subsequence scene of much 
ethnic violence. 1 27 Policy bias towards Kikuyus has led to their relative economic success, which 
has made them the object of resentment. The Kikuyu are thought of as the "indigenous 
inhabitants of Nairobi, [and] are a large component of the new elite, [and are well] represented in 
professional, clerical, administrative and political positions," thus Kikuyu is still of use in 
occupational interactions. 128 
Since the inception of multi-party elections in 1992, Kenya has been plagued by out 
breaks of ethnic violence.1 29 Luos have tried to drive Kikuyus from the Rift Valley and Kikuyus 
have responded in tum. 130  These tensions have escalated even more because of the ethnicities of 
the presidential candidates: Mwai Kibaki being Kikuyu, and Raila Odinga being Luo. These 
rivalries have been exacerbated by a history of particularist leaders like Kenyatta, followed by 
1 25 CIA World Factbook, "Kenya" 
126 BBC News, "Kenya" 
127 Human Rights Watch, Slaughter Among Neighbors: The Political Origins o/Communal Violence (New 
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Daniel arap Moi who sought rents for his own Kalenjin minority.131  Moi, who was in power from 
1978 to 1992 warned that Kenya would fall into tribal clashes as soon as multi-party elections 
were introduced. 1 32 However, many Moi as well as Odinga, and Kibaki have been criticized for 
doing nothing, as well as implicated in inciting violence leading up to elections. In Kenya one 
political truth is that tribes are the ticket to power which is precisely what politicians have been 
abusing.1 33 Ethnic violence occurred in the run-up to 1992, the first instance of multi-party 
elections; then again before the 1997 elections, and again before the 2001 elections. Kalenjin 
rational for communal violence in the rift valley is to send a political message to Kibaki as many 
b 1· d l '  . d 134 e leve e ectlOns were ngge . 
Opportunistic political leaders, like Moi, wanted people to subscribe to primordialist 
logic, in order to remain in power because repressive policies are the only way to keep ethnic 
violence at bay. The fact that Kenya did descended into 'tribal clashes' as Moi warned would 
seem to support primordialist theories, however, the occurrence of violence in the Rift Valley 
was actually the conniving orchestration of Moi for political gain. 1 35 
Kenyan institutions are not horribly oppressive, and in fact Kenya has the same level of 
freedom as Tanzania. The first major difference is a politically active military that political 
leaders have used to rig elections in their favor. The other major difference is the very low levels 
of trust in Kenyan institutions as well as for other ethnicities. While it is probably impossible to 
say why Tanzanians are more trusting 0 the government than Kenyans it can be stated that 
131 Human Rights Watch, Slaughter Among Neighbors 
1 32 Ibid 
1 33 Ibid 
134 Pascale Harter, "Inside Kenya's Burning Rift Valley," BBe News, January 30, 2008, 
http://news.bbc.co.ukl2/hilafrica/7217737.stm 
1 35 Human Rights Watch, Slaughter Among Neighbors 
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society creates institutions which intern reinforce societal nonns. Perhaps there is a nonn of trust 
in Tanzania. What is clear from these differences is that the actual democratic nature of 
institutions does not matter nearly as much as whether or not people believe into them. These 
measures are, after all, western measures of liberal democracy, and therefore inherently 
ethnocentric. It seems that ethnic violence in Kenya is politically motivated, due to the abuses of 
power politicians on all sides. It is unclear why Tanzanians trust their institutions and each other 
more than Kenyans, but what this pair of nations does indicate is that distrust in institutions 
makes violence an option for airing grievances. Tanzanians trust their institutions to resolve 
ethnic disputes, and therefore they engage in peaceful conflict, while Kenyans, who really have 
very few reasons to trust their institutions especially elections, do not have clear peaceful options 
for resolving ethnic conflict. 
Table 2 
Tanzania Kenya 
Politically active military * No Yes, under Moi 1992-1997 
Independent legislatures * Yes Yes 
Viable opposition parties * Yes Yes 
Free press * High, low in Self censorship 
Zanzibar 
Level of freedom **  7 - partly free 7 - partly free 
Trust in institutions ***  75.9% 56.9% 
Trust of own ethnicity compared to other 80.1% 49.3% 
ethnicities ***  67.4% 31.6% 
GDP per capita ****  1,354 1,746 
% below poverty line ****  36% 50% 
*determined by interpretive reading of BBC country profiles and articles 
**Freedom House- the number is a total of the rating for political and civil liberties, the lower the better with 14 as 
the maximum 
*** Afrobarometer Round 3 
****CIA World Fact book 
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Conclusion 
There are three theories or ways oflooking at ethnic violence: primordialist, 
instrumentalist, and constructivist. Primordialism posses assumptions about the nature of 
ethnicities, and about human nature. It asserts that ethnicity itself is the cause of ethnic violence 
and so nations that are more diverse are more likely to be violent. While ethnic diversity may be 
a necessary condition for ethnic conflict, it does not always lead to ethnic violence. 
Instrumentalism, very convincingly, explains that ethnic violence results from economic 
and political competition . . Either political elites use ethnic groups, or individuals make the 
rational choice to compete with other ethnic groups over scarce resources or access to political 
power such as executive office. While economic scarcity empirically correlates and explains 
some cases of violence it fails to explain how it is that so many poor countries are peaceful. The 
same can be said for political manipulation, which is present in many cases of violence. The 
instrumental use of ethnicity can explain ethnic conflict, but does not explain why conflict leads 
to violence. 
Finally constructivism, or the institutional argument, posits that the strength of political 
institutions best explains the occurrence or absence of ethnic peace. It is the only approach which 
answers how it is peace comes. In an answer to instrumentalist arguments constructivists find 
that institutions prevent circumstances such as political manipulation, and channel ethnic conflict 
into nonviolent forums. Strong institutions also create civic trust which means citizens believe 
that the ballot is more powerful than the bullet, or in many African cases the machete. 
Democratic outlets such as free and fair elections, viable opposition parties, and a free press 
enable individuals to enact change in the political system without murdering their neighbors. 
35 
One question unanswered is how outside forces affect ethnic violence. I t  could be that 
ethnic groups have an incentive to remain peaceful due to economic prosperity associated with 
peace or other geopolitical calculations. It could be the case that national minorities are better off 
as minorities in a larger nation rather than as majorities in a nation of their own, without any 
resources. Exogenous shock is completely left out of this study mostly because of the small N 
comparison design. Further research with more cases would better answer this problem in a 
generalizable way. 
The question of what causes ethnic peace has been ignored by scholarly research, and it is 
fundamentally different from the question of what causes ethnic violence. In looking at the other 
side of the coin this study has been able to observe different factors at play which will help in the 
prevention of future ethnic violence. Despite intransitivity in some of the findings of this study 
what has been clearly indicated by these comparisons and thick descriptions of the situation in 
these nations is that economic and political factors are not enough. They are certainly causal 
factors, but they do not capture all variance and so as scholars we must continue to investigate 
other variables. 
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